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APPEALS IN BANKRUPTCY:
TRAPS FOR THE UNWARY
by ROBERT

KRATOVIL*

and

RAYMOND J. WERNER**

IN GENERAL
The Bankruptcy Act' and the procedure surrounding it contain many traps which may ensnare the uninitiated practitioner
who relies upon the law as it appears in the United States Code.
The Act offers many instances in which the law is not what the
statutes say it is. This article attempts to explain some of those
uncertainties in the law. Special emphasis is placed on the prob2
lems related to review of the orders of the referee and the judge.
THE BANKRUPTCY RULES

-

PRECEDENTS ESTABLISHED

BY THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL AND
APPELLATE PROCEDURE

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure offer an illustration
of the type of trap discussed herein. When Congress empowered
the Supreme Court to prescribe these rules,8 it set a precedent
for the approach to be followed in establishing other procedural
* J.D., DePaul University. Mr. Kratovil, currently Vice-President
of Chicago Title and Trust Company, has, in addition to his teaching responsibilities, authored numerous legal articles as well as several textbooks in the area of real estate and mortgage law.
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law. An author and former law
clerk for the Illinois Appellate Court, Mr. Werner is currently serving
as a member of the General Counsel office of Chicago Title Insurance
Company.
1. For the purposes of the ensuing discussion, the Bankruptcy Act,
11 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1964), may hereinafter be cited as the Act. Similarly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will hereinafter be cited as
the Civil Rules, and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure will likewise be cited as the Appellate Rules. Finally, the Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, 411 U.S. 995 (1973), will hereinafter be cited as the Bankruptcy Rules.
2. The new rules add the term "Bankruptcy Judge" which is defined
to include the referee and the district judge when the latter acts in certain specified capacities. RULES OF BKY. P., Rule 901(7). The usage
of "referee" and "judge" in this article, however, corresponds to the traditional meanings of those terms as defined in sections 1(26) and 1(20)
of the Bankruptcy Act.
The Bankruptcy Act contains the following revelant definitions:
Bankruptcy Act, § 1(9), 11 U.S.C.S. § 1(9), "Court" shall mean the
judge -or the referee of the court of bankruptcy in which the proceedings are pending.
Bankruptcy Act, § 1(20), 11 U.S.C.S. § 1(20), "Judge" shall mean
a judge of a court of bankruptcy, not including the referee.
Bankruptcy Act, § 1(26), 11 U.S.C.S. § 1(26), "Referee" shall mean
the referee who has jurisdiction of the case or to whom the case has
been referred or anyone acting in his stead.
3. 28 U.S.C.S. § 2072.
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rules. 4 The Civil Rules, by reason of the statute authorizing
their adoption, displaced and superseded all earlier conflicting
laws. 5 In effect, this was a statutory recognition of the doctrine
of implied repeal, a form of repeal which creates traps for the
unwary practitioner. Because no listing or express repeal of superseded statutes was undertaken,6 the possibility exists that a
statute which remains on the books was repealed by the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Even though the Judicial Code of 1948 purported to eliminate from its text "the statutes made obsolute by the promulgation of the Federal Rules,' 7
the thoroughness of this housekeeping job is doubtful. 8 If this
is so with respect to the Judicial Code itself, the specter is raised
that other statutes scattered throughout the entire Code may also
be "obsolete."
Mention should be made of another trap. A practitioner
might conclude that a given statute has been impliedly repealed
by one or more of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example. If, however, Congress were later to amend that statute,
a question could well arise as to whether it had ever been repealed. Furthermore, statutes enacted subsequent to adoption of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can modify or supersede
4. Pub. L. No. 89-733, § 1, 80 Stat. 1323 amended 28 U.S.C.S. § 2072
to include the authorization to prescribe rules of "practice and procedure
of the.

. .

court of appeals

. .

. [and for] admiralty and maritime cases

and appeals therein, and the practice and procedure in proceedings for
the review by the courts of appeals of decisions of the Tax Court of the
United States and the judicial review or enforcement of orders of administrative agencies, boards, commissions and officers."
5. 28 U.S.C.C. § 2072 provides in part:
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or
effect after such rules have taken effect.
See also Penfield v. S.E.C., 330 U.S. 585 (1947). The historical development of the superseding effect of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is explained in somewhat greater detail in 2 J.MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
1.02(1) et seq. (2d ed. 1973). At this point there is an opportunity
to point out the danger of relying upon headnotes. Headnote number
two of In re Northern Transatlantic Carriers Corp., 423 F.2d 139 (1st Cir.
1970) states, "Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not repeal by implication conflicting statutes." That is not what the case says, and the law
as stated in the headnote is incorrect.
6. The rationalization for the failure of Congress to expressly repeal
those statutes impliedly repealed by the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure are set forth in 2 J.MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1.02(5)
129 (2d ed. 1973). In brief, it was felt that the task of ferreting out all
sections of the U.S. Code repealed by the Rules was of such magnitude
that oversights were certain to occur. This, in turn, provides an insight
into the magnitude of the burden thrust upon the practitioner.
7. 2 J.MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1.02(5), at 131 (2d ed. 1973). No
attempt was made to ferret out other sections of the United States Code
impliedly repealed by the Rules.
8. In 2 J.MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
1.02(5), at 131 (2d ed. 1973)
it is said:
Although a basically conservative revision, the 1948 Judicial Code
contained several important changes, and, for the most part eliminated the statutes made obsolete by the promulgation of the Federal
Rules (emphasis added).
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conflicting Federal Rules.0 As will later appear, the same problem is presented by the Appellate Rules.
SUPERSEDING EFFECT
BANKRUPTcY

OF THE NEW

RULES - IN GENERAL

Without specific reference to the matter of appeals, the ensuing discussion deals with the general proposition of the implied
repeal of existing statutes by adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules.
It has been noted in the preceeding discussion that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure superseded inconsistent procedural
statutes.10 This implied repeal was accomplished without listing
or expressly repealing the procedural statutes thus superseded.
The same approach was taken with the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure and with respect to the Bankruptcy
Rules." To the extent that the rules conflict with pre-existing
statutory law, the Bankruptcy Rules prevail. 12 Although it has
been said "that a 'repealer' will delete from the act all provisions
which have found their way into the rules, leaving but a skeleton
of the Act as it stands today,"" the task of expressly repealing
the superseded statutes has never been carried out. Many provisions repealed by implication remain in the United States Code
to mislead the unwary lawyer. Thus, to repeat, the Bankruptcy
Rules have impliedly repealed many statutes, and the practitioner is faced with the possibility that many sections of the
United States Code, sections which bear no evidence of being repealed, are no longer operative.
Still another problem persists in that once a possibly inconsistent statute is identified, it may be difficult or impossible to
absolutely determine, without judicial interpretation, whether in
fact the provision is inconsistent with the rules and therefore
4
ineffective.
Thus the attorney practicing in the bankruptcy courts must
be aware of three sets of rules of practice: (1) the Bankruptcy
Rules, (2) the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and (3) the Fed9. 2 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

1.02(5), at 128 (2d ed. 1973).

10. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
11. 28 U.S.C.S. § 2075. This statute, which gives the court the power
to prescribe the bankruptcy rules, .provides in part, "[a]ll laws in conflict
with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after the rules have
taken effect." Another portion of this same section makes it clear that
the rules are not to "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."
12. 28 U.S.C.S. § 2075. TREISTER & TROST, RESOURCE MATERIALS FOR
FEDERAL

BANKRUPTCY

PROCEDURE

UNDER THE

NEW

BANKRUPTCY

RULES

4 (1973); Levit, The New Bankruptcy Rules, 57 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 2 (1973);

Treister, The New Bankruptcy Rules, 48 CALIF. ST. B.J. 522, 524 (1973).
13. Herzog, The Impact of the Proposed Bankruptcy Rules on the
Court, 45 Am.BKY. L.J. 363, 364 (1971).
14. See Treister, The New Bankruptcy Rules, 48 CALIF. ST. B.J. 522,
524 (1973).
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eral Rules of Appellate Procedure. All three of these sets of
rules are beset, to varying degrees, with the problems created by
the implied repeal of prior inconsistent statutes. Presumably, as
these rules are expanded or modified the dilemma caused by implied repeal will become more acute.
Furthermore, the determination that a pre-existing statute
is inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Rules does not end the inquiry. Conceivably, a statute might not be repealed even though
it is blatantly inconsistent with the rules. When the Supreme
Court was given the power to prescribe these rules, that power
was limited to matters of procedure as opposed to matters of substance. 15 The difficulty of course arises from the fact that the
line between substance and procedure is not always easily
drawn. 16 The fact remains, however, that if a Bankruptcy Rule
is deemed to be substantive it is outside of the powers of the
court and thus invalid, having no effect upon a prior inconsistent
17
statute.
APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL RuLEs OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE TO BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE

Historically, under the practice as it existed prior to the

adoption of the new Bankruptcy Rules, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure applied to bankruptcy proceedings. 8 The Civil Rules
were applicable to bankruptcy actions not by their own terms,219
0
but rather by reason of the language of the Bankruptcy Act

and General Order 37.21 The Civil Rules did not, however, apply
15. 28 U.S.C.S. § 2075 provides in part:
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive
right.
Bankruptcy Rules, rule 1 also provides: "the rules and forms in this
Title 1 governs the procedure in courts of bankruptcy in bankruptcy
cases.

.

." (emphasis added).

16. Levit, The New Bankruptcy Rules, 57 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 2 (1973).
An excellent discussion of the substance-procedure problem is found
in Landers, The New Bankruptcy Rules: Relics of the Past as Fixtures
of the Future, 57 MINN. L. REV. 827 (1973).
17. See generally Note, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1471 (1957). Obviously
adoption of the Rules by the Supreme Court cannot be regarded as an
adjudication of the validity of the Rules.
18. 9 AM. JuR. 2d Bankruptcy § 109 (1963). See also Yankwich, The
Impact of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on Bankruptcy, 29 REF.
J. 75 (1955).
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 81 (a) (1) reads: these rules . . . do not apply to
proceedings in bankruptcy .

.

. except in so far as they may be made

applicable by rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United
States. See also 6A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
59.04(12), at 59-28
(2d ed. 1973).
20. Bankruptcy Act, § 21(k), 11 U.S.C.S. § 44(k).
21. General Orders and Forms in Bankruptcy, 172 U.S. 653 (1898).
General Order 37 reads:
In proceedings under the Act .

.

. the Rules of Civil Procedure for

the District Courts of the United States shall, in so far as they are
not inconsistent with the Act . . . or with these general orders, be

followed as nearly as may be.
See also General Order 22.

1974]
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to the extent that they were inconsistent with the Act or the general orders. 22 General Order 37 caused some difficulties since it
was not always easy to "decide whether and to what extent a
'23
particular civil rule [was] 'inconsistent' or applicable.
To rectify this problem the Bankruptcy Rules are more certain as to the applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The drafting committee sought to conform bankruptcy
procedure to that set forth in the Civil Rules. 24 Although the
nature of bankruptcy procedure made it impossible to completely
follow the Civil Rules, the policy expressed in abrogated General
Order 3725 was carried out and, where practicable, the Bank'26
ruptcy Rules follow the Civil Rules "as nearly as may be."
Many of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been
adopted in whole, in part, or with modification. 27 The Bankruptcy Rules contained in Part VII,28 for example, are largely
adaptations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 29 The correlation exists to such extent that even the numeration of the
Bankruptcy Rules in this part corresponds to the equivalent rule
of Civil Procedure.
APPEAL FROM A REFEREE'S ORDER TIME FOR APPEAL

Prior to the Bankruptcy Rules, section 39c of the Bankruptcy
Act" allowed the "person aggrieved" 31 by a referee's order the
opportunity to obtain review by filing a petition with the judge 82
22. Levit, The New Bankruptcy Rules, 57

MARQ.

L. Ruv. 1 (1973).

A

good outline of which Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did and did not

apply in bankruptcy proceedings is found in WRIGHT & MMLER, FEDERAL
.PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1016 (1969).

23. Treister, A Practicing Lawyer's Primer to the Proposed New
Bankruptcy Rules, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 343, 348 (1971). The lack of uniformity in bankruptcy procedure prior to the adoption of the new rules,
in spite of the existence of General Order 37, is discussed in Herzog, The
Impact of the Proposed Bankruptcy Rules on the Court, 45 AM. BANKR.

L.J. 363 (1971).
24. Seligson, The New Bankruptcy Rules, 76 COM. L.J. 383, 385
(1971).
25. The Supreme Court order of April 24, 1973, which promulgated
the new bankruptcy rules, also abrogated General Orders 22 and 37.
Bankruptcy Rules and Official Bankruptcy Forms, 411 U.S. 989, 991
(1973).

26. Seligson, The New Bankruptcy Rules, 76 COM. L.J. 383, 385

(1971).
27. Herzog, The Impact of the Proposed Bankruptcy Rules on the

Court, 47 AM. BANKR. L.J. 363, 364 (1971). See, e.g., Bankruptcy Rules,
rules 762, 765, 916, 923 and 924.
28. Bankruptcy Rules, rules 701 et seq.
29. Seligson, The New Bankruptcy Rules, 76 COM. L.J. 383, 389
(1971).
30. 11 U.S.C.S. § 67(c).
31. 2A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
39.19 at 1492 (14th ed. 1974) discusses the meaning of this term.
32. See note 2 supra.
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within ten days of the entry of the order or within any extention
of that time period.3 3 If the petition for review was not filed
within the alotted time, the referee's order became final.8 4 The
absolute nature of the ten-day limitation stemmed from legislation enacted in 1960,' 5 and the courts have required strict adherence to the mandatory provisions of this section.86 A referee's
order not brought before the judge for review within the tenday period was final notwithstanding the aggrieved party's failure to receive notice of the entry of the order.37 The harshness
of this rule was justified because "it is incumbent upon creditors
to follow the record of the administration of the bankruptcy estate and discover for themselves orders which they may want
to challenge. '38 The rule was needed. Stability was required
for the benefit of the estate, the creditors and the bankrupt.
In 1960 when section 39c was amended to clearly spell out
the mandatory nature of the requirement that a petition for review be filed within ten days from the entry of the questioned
order, 39 it was thought that this modification fixed the time limits for review of a referee's order with finality. 40 One minor
loophole was left, however, since by express provision the time
for filing such petition could be extended indefinitely. When the
order questioned involved property, no one could act with safety
until the extension period had expired. Hopefully this area of
uncertainty has been removed by the new Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure.
The Bankruptcy Rules make the procedure of bankruptcy appeals roughly equivalent to that under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 41 even to the effect that the terminology is
changed to coincide with traditional appellate notions. For example, what was formerly a petition to review a referee's order
33. Treatment of the review of a referee's order under former practice

is described in Hunt, Appeals in Bankruptcy Cases, 10 S.

CAL. L. REv.

296 (1937).

34. Bankruptcy Act § 39c, 11 U.S.C.S. § 67 (c).
35. Id.
36. In re Imperial "400" National, Inc., 391 F.2d 163 (3rd Cir. 1968).
37. In re Abilene Flour Mills Co., 439 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1971);

In re General Insecticide, Inc., 403 F.2d 629, 630-31 (2d Cir. 1968); St.

Regis Paper Co. v. Jackson, 369 F.2d 136, 141-42 (5th Cir. 1966). This
latter case contains a discussion of the history of the ten-day rule.
38. In re General Insecticide, Inc., 403 F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 1968).
See also In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 111, 118 (1973).
39. The 1960 amendment was a response to Pfister v. Northern Illinois Finance Corp., 317 U.S. 144 (1942) which held that the District Court
could review a referee's order notwithstanding the fact that the petition
for review was filed after the expiration of the ten-day period. See S.
Rep. No. 1689, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWs
3194-97.
40. See 2A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
39.2014.1] (14th ed. 1974).
41. See generally Treister, The New Bankruptcy Rules, 48 CALIF. ST.

B.J. 523, 603 (1973); Levit, The New Bankruptcy Rules, 57
1,20 (1973).

MARQ.

L.
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is now a notice of appeal, and this document must, as before, be
filed within ten days.

42

A timely motion of the type described in the Bankruptcy
Rules, 43 on the order appealed from, suspends the running of the
ten-day period. Further, a twenty-day extension of the time for
filing the notice of appeal may be obtained upon motion of a
party. 44

That request for extension must, however, be filed be-

fore the ten-day period has expired "except that a request made
after the expiration of such time may be granted upon a showing
of excusable neglect if the judgment or order does not authorize
the sale of any property.

' 45

The quoted language, while helpful, still contains an ambiguity. Two conflicting interpretations have been expressed. It
has been stated that "an extension of time may not be granted
if the judgment or order authorized the sale of real estate. ' 46
That position is in conflict with the one taken in the Advisory
Committee's Notes which state:
When the judgment or order appealed from authorizes the sale
of property, it becomes final 10 days after its entry unless
within
47
the 10-day period a . . . request for extension is filed.
In any event, the maximum time within which an appeal may
be filed is thirty days. 48 The stability of transactions involving
a sale of property is attained by requiring the party seeking re42. Bankruptcy Rules, rule 802 (a).
43. Bankruptcy Rules, rule 802(b). Effect of a Motion on Time for
Appeal. The running of the time for filing a notice of appeal is terminated as to all parties by a timely motion filed with the referee by any
party pursuant to the rules hereafter enumerated in this subdivision. The
full time for appeal fixed by this rule commences to run and is to be
computed from the entry of any of the following orders made upon a
timely motion under such rules: (1) granting or denying a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 115 (b) (4); (2) granting or denying a motion under Rule 752(b) to amend or make additional
findings of fact, whether or not an alternation of the judgment would
be required if the motion is granted; (3) granting or denying a motion
under Rule 923 to alter or amend the judgment; or (4) denying a motion
for a new trial under Rule 923.
44. Bankruptcy Rules, rule 802 (c).
45. Bankruptcy Rules, rule 802(c). Compare FED. R. App. P. rule
4(a) which contains a provision for the extension of the time for filing
a notice of appeal in civil cases upon a showing of "excusable neglect"
but includes no reference to orders that authorize a sale of property.
46. Bessman, The New Rules of Procedure in Straight Bankruptcy,
46 Wisc. BAR. BULL. 7, 19 (Dec. 1973). See also Levit, The New Bankruptcy Rules, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 20 (1973). It is unclear why lessees
and lenders were not accorded similar protection. Borrowings on receiver's certificates often run into substantial figures, for example.
47. Advisory Committee's Notes to Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,
rule 802. This position is reaffirmed in the Advisory Committee's Notes
to Rule 11-62 and Proposed Rule 10-801. See also King, The Proposed
Chapter XI Rules and Official Forms, 47 AM. BANKR. J. 127, 144-45
(1973); Treister, The New Bankruptcy Rules, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 523, 603
(1973); Treister, A Practicing Lawyer's Primer on the Proposed New
Bankruptcy Rules, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 343 (1971).
48. See Advisory Committee's Notes, RULES OF BKY. PRO. rule 802.

8

The John Marshall Journalof Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 8:1

view to file his request for extension within the ten-day period
or be bound by the finality of the referee's order. 49 This same
scheme is followed in the rules for Chapter XI ° and the Proposed Rules for Chapters X, and XII.51
Another problem relates to the time periods established by
the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for filing briefs on appeal to
the district court. 52 The Bankruptcy Rules allow fifteen days
from the docketing of the appeal for the filing of the appellant's
brief, a like period for the filing of the appellee's brief and five
days for the filing of a reply brief. An uncertainty develops in
that the time periods may not be uniform from district to district
since allowance is made for different periods if local rules so
state. 53 While this provision recognizes the desirability of allowing local variations, 54 it creates problems for the practitioner who
fails to consult the local rules.
TOLLING THE TEN-DAY PERIOD - OTHER
CHANGES EFFECTED BY THE
BANKRUPTCY RULES
Aside from the possibility of collateral attack upon the referee's order, case law prior to the adoption of the Bankruptcy
Rules had developed other limitations upon the applicability of
section 39c. Many of these concepts dealt not with review of the
referee's directives by the judge, but rather with reexamination
of orders by the referee himself.55 One such limitation stemmed
from the inherent power of the referee to reconsider his own orders.56 In fact, the referee by the terms of his order often reserved to himself the power of modification. This power, by its
very nature, implied that it might be exercised after the ten-day
period expired.
Further limitation was once found in the principle that section 39c was not applicable "when the referee's order being questioned is of a type usually characterized as 'administrative.' ,,r,
49. See Bankruptcy Rules rule 803. See also Treister, The New
Bankruptcy Rules, 48 CALIF. ST.B.J. 523, 604 (1973).
50. See Bankruptcy Rule 11-62.

51. See Proposed Bankruptcy Rules, rules 10-801 and 12-61.

52. Bankruptcy Rules, rule 808.
53. Id.
54. See Advisory Committee's Notes to Bankruptcy Rules, rule 808.
55. See, e.g., Thomas Corp. v. Nicholas, 221 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1955).
56. In re Meter Maid Industries, Inc., 462 F.2d 436, 439 (5th Cir. 1972).
See also 2A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 38.09(3) and 39.17 (14th ed. 1974).
57. Flaxman, Coleman, Gorman & Rosoff v. Cheek, 355 F.2d 672 (9th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied 384 U.S. 954 (1966). 2A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

%39.18 (14th ed. 1974) points out that this exemption from the ten-day

period applied only to those orders which were entered "informally and
without notice or hearing." For a description of the types of orders
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Thus, there were countless types of ministerial orders which the
referee himself could have reviewed either sua sponte or upon
motion of the parties,58 and that review could have been carried
out after the ten-day period had expired. Of course, once the
estate was closed, the order was beyond revision. 59
The Bankruptcy Rules put an end to this practice.60 The application of rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
through Bankruptcy Rule 923 requires that the initiative for
modification or amendment be taken within ten days after the
entry of an order. 61 The indefiniteness which existed prior to
the adoption of the rules no longer exists. If the order is not
modified within the ten-day period, it is beyond change, except
as allowed by other provisions of the Bankruptcy Rules.6 2 The
same time limitation would be applicable whether the modification is suggested by a party or by the referee himself.
Another problem which had developed under the former
practice revolved around what had come to be termed the "unentertained" petition for rehearing. The nature of this peculiar
animal is probably best described in Pfister v. Northern Illinois
Finance.6 3 The initial task undertaken by the court or referee
upon the filing of a petition for rehearing is the consideration
of whether "the petition sets out, and the facts-if any are offered-support, grounds for opening the original order ....-64
At this point the court may determine that no grounds exist for
such reexamination. If that be the case the petition is "unentertained." On the other hand, the court may grant the petition
which may be characterized as "administrative," see Copenhaver, Rehearing and Review in Bankruptcy, 42 REF. J. 101 (1968).
58. 2A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 39.18 (14th ed. 1974).

59. Flaxman, Coleman, Gorman & Rosoff v. Creek, 355 F.2d 672, 674
(9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 384 U.S. 954 (1966); Fazakerly v. E. Kahn's
Sons Co., 75 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1935). See also 2A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
39.18 (14th ed. 1974).
60. Advisory Committee's Notes, Bankruptcy Rules, rule 924 state:

These rules do not preserve the features of the practice pertaining to so-called "administrative orders," which have been regarded
as subject at any time to reconsideration by the referee or to review
by the district court without regard to the limitations of § 39c of
the Act.
61. This statement must, of course, be read in light of FED. R. Civ.

P. 60, which is made applicable to Bankruptcy procedure by Bankruptcy

Rule 924, allowing motions to be made after the expiration of the tenday period. For a discussion of the intricacies involved in the practice
under these rules see 6A & 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, Ch. 59-60 (2d
ed. 1974); Annot. 13 A.L.R. Fed. 794 (1972); Annot. 14 A.L.R. Fed. 309
(1973); Annot. 15 A.L.R. Fed. 193 (1973). See also Note, 25 TEMP. L.Q.
77 (1951); Comment, 17 U. CHI. L. REv. 664 (1950); Note, 61 YALE L.J.
76 (1952); Copenhaver, Rehearing and Review in Bankruptcy, 42 REF.
J. 101-102-107 (1968).
62. See Bankruptcy Rules, rule 924.
63. 317 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1942). See Annot. 10 A.L.R.2d 1075 (1950).
See also Annot. 148 A.L.R. 795 (1944).

64. 317 U.S. at 150.
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for rehearing and reexamine the issues of the original order,
thereafter entering an order either denying or allowing modification of the original order.6 5 This would be an "entertained" petition for rehearing.
The only reliable tool for determining whether or not the
petition for rehearing was "entertained" or "unentertained" is
the order entered upon the disposition of the petition. It will
either state that the court refused to allow the petition for rehearing or it refused to modify the original order. 66 Of course,
if the original order is modified, the court entertained the petition. The crucial nature of this inquiry results from the impact
of the order on the unentertained petition for rehearing upon the
time allowed for review of the referee's order. If the petition
for rehearing had been entertained, the time for review would
have begun to run anew from the entry of the order on the petition. If, however, the petition had not been entertained, the time
for review would not have been enlarged. This is pointed out
in Wayne United Gas Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 7 where the
court stated:
A defeated party who applies for a rehearing and does not appeal
from the judgment or decree within the time limited for so doing,
takes the risk that he may lose his right of appeal, as the application for rehearing, if the court refuses to entertain it, does not
extend the time for appeal. 68
Since the Court was only setting forth a rule of law under which
the lower court decided the case, this language is clearly dictum.
Nonetheless, the statement has led one author to conclude that
the time for filing notice of appeal is not tolled by a petition for
rehearing when the court refuses to entertain that motion.6 9 Another author has taken a contrary view,70 a view based upon a
footnote in Pfister which reads:

Where a petition for rehearing is filed before the time for a petition for review has expired, it tolls the running of the time, and
limitation upon proceedings for review begins from the date of
denial of the petition for rehearing.71
Whatever may be the correct view, the task remains to analyze
the language of the court in Pfister and determine whether the
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 149.
Id. at 150.
300 U.S. 131 (1936).
Id. at 137.
69. 9 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
See also 2A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

204.12[6], at 966 (2d ed. 1973).

25.08[1] fn.6 at 929 (14th ed.

1974).
70. Copenhaver, Rehearing and Review in Bankruptcy, 42 REF. J. 101,
104 (1968).
71. 317 U.S. 144, 149 n.7 (1942). The belief is stated in Copenhaver,
supra note 67, that the court seemed to make a special point of indicating that the rule stated in dictum in Wayne was no longer applicable.
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rules there set forth were affected by the adoption of the Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure.
Pfister involved the following factual situation 72 which arose
out of a farm debt relief proceeding. 73 On August 13, 1940, the
conciliation commissioner 74 entered an order which fixed rental
payments to be made by the debtor and also ordered a stay or
moratorium which related back to April 26. An order of sale was
entered on September 7. On September 16, a petition for rehearing of the August 13 order was filed and four days later a similar
petition was filed directed at the order of September 7. The petition for rehearing of the September 7 order was denied on September 30, and nine days later a petition for review of the order
was filed. Rehearing of the August 13 order was denied on November 28 and on that same day a petition for review of that order
was filed. The district court dismissed the petition for review,
grounding its decision on the concept that it had no jurisdiction
75
to hear the cases.
The Supreme Court in Pfister made statements which, although valid at the time made, were in part modified or overturned by the subsequent adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules.
Those statements are analyzed as follows:
Where a petition for rehearing of a referee's order is permitted
to be filed, after the expiration of the time for a petition for
review, and during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings,
as here, they may be acted on, that is, they may be granted 'be* fore rights have vested on the faith of the action'....76
Note is made of the fact that the Pfister court stated that untimely petitions for review of referee's orders may be granted in
the discretion of the court. 7 Congress, some eighteen years
later, amended section 39c78 to clarify the limitation on review
of a referee's order.79 This amendment, enacted to bring stability
and exactitude to the time periods allowed for the filing of a petition for review by the judge, had no express impact upon the
time period for the filing of a petition for rehearing by the referee.8 0 Thus, there was no statutory change in the uncertainty
72. The Pfister opinion contains a somewhat garbled factual state-

ment. A better chronology is found in the opinion of the lower court
in In re Pfister, 123 F.2d 543 (7th Cir. 1941).
73. Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.S. § 203 et seq.
74. A referee appointed by the district court to handle agriculture
compositions.

See the Bankruptcy Act, § 75(a), 11 U.S.C.S. § 203(a).

75.
76.
77.
78.

317 U.S. at 147.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 153.
Pub. L. No. 86-662, 74 Stat. 528.
79. S. Rep. No. 1689, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), 2 U.S. CODE
& AD. NEWS 3194-3195.

CONG.

80. See Copenhaver, Rehearing and Review in Bankruptcy, 42 REF.
J. 101, 106 (1968) where it is stated:
This is borne out by the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on this
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caused by the above-quoted statement. The petition for rehearing could result in the original order being modified even if
filed out of time. The new Bankruptcy Rules make the procedure more rigid.
Rule 923 makes rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to bankruptcy. This clarifies a conflict which
existed among the circuits."' Rule 59 (a) allows a new trial to
be granted as to all or some of the parties and as to all or some
of the issues for any of the reasons for which rehearings had been
granted in suits in equity.82 The motion for new trial, formerly
a petition for rehearing, must be made "not later than ten days
after the entry of the judgment. '8 The application of this rule
to bankruptcy matters in effect overrules the above-quoted statement from the Civil Rules. Now the petition for rehearing must
s4
be filed within ten days of the entry of the order.
Another statement of the Court in Pfister also dealt with untimely petitions for rehearing:
[W]here out of time petitions for rehearing are filed and the
referee or court merely considers whether the petition sets out,
amendment, from which report it would not appear that there was
any design to disturb the fairly well settled rules respecting motions
or petitions for reconsideration or rehearing.
81. This conflict is described in Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule
923 as follows:
Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has generally been
deemed applicable to a "petition for rehearing" of an order entered
in bankruptcy cases. See, e.g., Claybrook Drilling Co. v. Divanco,
Inc., 336 F.2d 697, 700 (10th Cir. 1964) (petition for rehearing of orders invalidating security interest, reducing unsecured claim, and refusing to compel compliance with Chapter X plan held timely under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b)); In re Marachowski Stores Co., 188 F.2d 686,
688-89 (7th Cir. 1951) (motion for rehearing of orders dismissing involuntary bankruptcy petition and directing payment of fees and expenses to custodian held not timely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 (b) and
denial thereof not appealable); Copenhaver, Rehearing and Review
in Bankruptcy, 42 Ref. J. 101, 103 (1968). But cf. American United
Life Ins. Co. v. Haines City, Fla., 117 F.2d 574, 576 (5th Cir. 1941)
(Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 deemed inapplicable to order confirming a plan
under Chapter IX of the Act); 2 Collier Par. 25.07[2] (1969); 6A
Moore Par. 59.04[12] (1954). This rule resolves the doubts as to the
applicability of the rule in bankruptcy, but it does not restrict the
discretion vested in the court by Rule 307 to reconsider an order allowing or disallowing a claim.
See also Drake, Contested Matters and Ex Parte Procedure in Bankruptcy, 19 MERCER L. REv. 318, 331 (1968).
82. "Court of Bankruptcy are courts of equity without terms." Pfister v. Northern Illinois Finance Corp., 317 U.S. 144, 152 (1942).
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 59 (b). See also FED. R. Crv. P. 6 (b).
84. But see Copenhaver, Rehearing and Review in Bankruptcy, 42
REF. J. 101, 105 (1968) which states that the quoted rule of Pfister "is
somewhat the same in effect as the motion under Rule 60(b)." The
foggy area of practice under Rules 59 and 60 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is discussed in 6A & 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, ch.
59 & 60 (2d ed. 1974); Annot. 13 A.L.R. Fed. 794 (1972); Annot. 14 A.L.R.
Fed. 309 (1973); Annot. 15 A.L.R. Fed. 193 (1973). See also Note, 43
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 98 (1967); Note, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 77 (1951); Comment,
17 U. Cm. L. REV. 664 (1950); Note, 61 YALE L.J. 76 (1952).
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and the facts-if any are offered-support, grounds for opening
the original order and determines that no grounds for a reexamination of the original order are shown, the hearing upon or examination of the grounds for allowing a rehearing
does not enlarge
85
the time for review of the original order.
As noted above, the application of rule 59 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure to bankruptcy cases requires the petition for
rehearing to be filed within ten days. The untimely filing would
not have any effect upon the time allowed for the filing of a notice of appeal. If the time has passed, so has the opportunity
for review.
The next considered statement of the Pfister court reads:
Where a petition for rehearing is filed before the time for a petition for review has expired, it tolls the running of the time, and
limitation upon proceedings for review
begins from the date of
86
denial of the petition for rehearing.
The same result obtains under the new Bankruptcy Rules. A
motion in the traditional form of a petition for rehearing will,
if timely filed, toll the running of the limitations period on appeals. The period will begin to run anew from the date of the
order disposing of the petition or motion.
As noted above, the new Bankruptcy Rules expressly apply
rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to bankruptcy
practice. 87 The notes of the Advisory Committee indicate that
this is the rule under which petitions for rehearing would be
filed. The Bankruptcy Rules further provide that the filing of
88
a timely motion terminates the time for filing notice of appeal.
The full time for appeal then commences to run from the entry
of an order granting or denying such motion. 89 This form of
practice in effect preserves the rule enunciated in Pfister.
For the same reason, the last remaining rule of Pfister is also
preserved. The court said:
When such a petition for rehearing is granted and the issues of
the original order are reexamined and an order is entered, either
denying or allowing a change in the original order, the time for
review under 39 (c) begins to run from that entry.90
A like result follows under today's practice. The filing of a
timely motion tolls the running of the period of appeal, which
will begin to run anew from the time the order is entered disposing of the motion.9 '
85.
86.
.87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

317 U.S. at 150.
Id. at 149 n.7.
Bankruptcy Rules, rule 923.
Bankruptcy Rules, rule 802 (b).
Id.
317 U.S. at 149.
See FE-D. R. Civ. P. 59; Bankruptcy Rules, rule 802.
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PRESERVATION OF THE STATUS Quo DURING
THE PENDENCY OF THE APPEAL

The new Bankruptcy Rules call attention to another question. When an appeal is taken from a referee's order which authorizes the sale of property, and the appellant takes no steps
to preserve the status quo during the pendency of that appeal,
does a third party purchaser take subject to the outcome of the
appeal? Unfortunately, absent statutory clarification, this area
of the law is shrouded in doubt and the results one encounters
are inequitable.9 2 This doubt was evidently recognized and dealt
with as an afterthought in the Chapter XI rules which provide:
Unless an order approving a sale of property or issuance of a

certificate of indebtedness is stayed pending appeal, the sale to
a good faith purchaser or the issuance of a certificate to a good
faith holder shall not be affected by the reversal or modification

of such order on appeal whether or 93
not the purchaser or holder
knows of the pendency of the appeal.
This rule makes it incumbent upon the appellant to obtain a stay
to preserve the status quo pending appeal if he wishes to preserve
the fruits of his appeal, an action which may require that the
94
appellant file a bond.
Unfortunately, this provision was not included in the rules
for straight bankruptcy9 5 or for Chapter XIII,96 the other rules
which are currently in force. What result then follows under
these chapters? Indeed, what result follows upon appeal from
the district court to the Circuit Court of Appeals? It is feared
that the appellant will in effect have the fruits of the appeal preserved for him without having to post a bond to secure the successful appellee. 97 Where a referee's order directs the sale of
property and the property is sold to a good faith purchaser pending an appeal from the order of sale, the rules should make it
clear that the purchaser's title is not affected by a reversal unless
a bond has been posted and the effect of the order of sale has been
stayed.
If the appellant wants protection, it would not be unreasonable to require that he give security to the appellee who would,
absent the taking of the appeal, be free to act upon the validity
of the referee's order. Though the drafters of the Chapter XI
rules recognized this fault and made appropriate changes, no
92. Kratovil & Werner, Appeals and Reversals-A Vast Wasteland,
49 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 844 (1974).

93. Bankruptcy Rules, rule 11-62(2).
94. Bankruptcy Rules, rule 805. This rule is made applicable to
Chapter XI proceedings by Bankruptcy Rules, rule 11-62.
95. See Bankruptcy Rules, rule 805.
96. See Bankruptcy Rules, rule 13-801.
97. Supra note 91.
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similar changes were made to the Bankruptcy Rules already
adopted.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT
TO THE CIRCUIT COURT

Just as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the new
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure supersede prior conflicting statutes,98 the adoption of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
has the same effect. 99 Thus, these rules in fact repeal many statutes which, on their face, bear no evidence of being repealed.
With specific application to the Bankruptcy Act, the lawyer involved in an appeal from a district judge's order will come upon
section 25a' 0 0 which provides that the appeal can be taken within
thirty days from the time written notice had been served upon
the aggrieved party. Relying upon this section, he would feel
confident in the continued existence of the order after he had
waited for the requisite period of time' 0 ' to pass with no appeal
having been taken. His reliance would be misplaced, however,
as for all practical purposes section 25a does not even exist. It
is one of the statutes which was superseded by the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 0 2 Accordingly rule
4a of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure must be referred
to rather than section 25a of the Bankruptcy Act.
Although the time period of thirty days for filing a notice
of appeal under this rule is the same as that under the superseded section of the Bankruptcy Act, there are two important differences. First, if the United States is a party to the proceeding,
and it frequently is in bankruptcy proceedings, the time for filing
notice of appeal is sixty days, not thirty. Secondly, the thirty98. See notes 5, 11 supra and accompanying text.
99. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072 empowered the Supreme Court to prescribe

rules of practice and procedure of the Courts of appeals. That section

reads in part:
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or
effect after such rules have taken effect.
See also 9 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 201.07, at 533-34 (2d ed. 1973).
100. 11 U.S.C.S. § 48(a).

101. The thirty-day period is extended to forty days if the notice is
not served.

102. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY at 891 (14th ed. 1974). See also Advisory Committee's Notes, FED. R. APP. P., 4a. The reader is cautioned
in that the note was prepared before the rules had been adopted and
speaks in the appropriate tense for the time it was written. It is this
fact that explains the note's assertion that section 25a is still in existence.

Today's reading of that note should be done under the realization that
the then present has passed. This note also describes the historical prob-

lems with section 25a. As a matter of historical interest, the reader may
be interested in Hunt, Appeals from the District Courts to the Circuit
Courts of Appeals in Bankruptcy Cases, 42 COMM. L.J. 131 (1937). See
also Selverstone, Appeals in Bankruptcy, Al CORP. REORG. & AM. BKY.

REV. 338 (1938); Hunt, Appeals in Bankruptcy Cases, 10 S. CAL. L. REV.

296, 307 (1937).
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day period may be extended for an additional thirty days. Although this extension is conditioned upon a "showing of excusable neglect,"'10 3 it may be granted pursuant to a motion made
after the original thirty-day period has expired. The net result
of all of this is the fact that the attorney who has, in reliance
upon section 25a of the Bankruptcy Act, waited the prescribed
thirty or forty-day period before advising his client to change position, may well have inadvertantly advised his client to embark
upon a perilous course of action. An appeal may thereafter be
filed, and if successful, it may modify or reverse the decree upon
10 4
which the client has acted.
A somewhat related problem, caused by the adoption of the
new Bankruptcy Rules, revolves around the procedure to be followed upon appeal from a district judge's order in bankruptcy
cases. Under the practice as it existed prior to the adoption of
the bankruptcy rules, General Order 36 made it clear that the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure governed. 10 5 The General
Order which created this certainty was abrogated by the order
which prescribed the straight bankruptcy rules. 0 6
Discussion of the mode of appeal from the district court to
the Circuit Court of Appeals in bankruptcy matters rests on the
supposition that such appeals are governed by the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure. Nowhere is there a totally convincing
categorical statement that this is the case. Indeed, the language
one encounters is muddy. The statute authorizing the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure gave the Supreme
Court the power to prescribe the "practice and procedure of the
...
courts of appeals of the United States in civil actions
... ."o Moore notes that the term "'civil actions' has never
embraced proceedings authorized by the Bankruptcy Act."'
However, although his language is not clear, Moore apparently
concludes that the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure do in103. FED. R. APP. P. 4 (a).
104. Procedure for review to the United States Supreme Court is set
forth in 2A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 25.35 et seq. (14th ed. 1974). Historical reference may also be made to Hunt, Appeals in Bankruptcy
Cases, 10 S. CAL. L. REV. 296, 322 (1937).
105. Former General Order 36, 305 U.S. 698 (1939), reads:
Appeals shall be regulated, except as otherwise provided in the Act,
by the rules governing appeals in civil actions in the courts of the
United States, including the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District
Courts of the United States.
106. Supreme Court order of April 24, 1973, 411 U.S. 991 (1973).
107. 28 U.S.C.S. § 2072 (emphasis added).
108. 9 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 201.06[3] (2d ed. 1973) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted). But see 2A COLLIER ON BANKURPTCY § 25,
at 893 (14th ed. 1974). Note: FED. R. APP. P. 4(a) applies to "civil
case[s]" which the rule defines to include "a proceeding in bankruptcy
or a controversy arising therein." See also the committee note to rule
4(a) which states, "Since this subdivision governs appeals in all civil
cases, it supersedes the provisions of section 25 of the Bankruptcy Act."
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deed apply to appeals from the district court in bankruptcy pro-

ceedings. 10 9 The Federal Appellate Rules themselves, in stating
their scope, do not explicitly extend their application to proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act. 110 However, a noted commentator concludes that the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ap-

ply to appeals in bankruptcy.'
Attention is also directed to the fact that prior to the adop12
tion of the Appellate Rules, rules 73 and 76 of the Civil Rules
attempted to govern the taking of an appeal from the district
court to the Circuit Court of Appeals. It was held in Scott v.
Jones'1 3 and Coursey v. International Harvester Co. 11 4 that appeals to the Circuit Court in bankruptcy cases were governed by
those rules. The adoption of the Appellate Rules, however,
brought about the abrogation of Civil Rules 73 to 76.15 In lieu
109. 9 J. MOORE,FEDERAL PRACTICE 201.06[3] (2d ed. 1973) reads:
As a matter of history, the term "civil actions" has never embraced
proceedings authorized by the Bankruptcy Act. The authority of the
Supreme Court to prescribe rules for proceedings authorized by the
Act is found in 28 U.S.C. § 2075, not in 28 U.S.C. § 2072, which contains the authority to make rules in civil actions. Section 2075 authorizes the Court "to prescribe by general rules the forms of process, writs, pleadings and motions, and the practice and procedure under the Bankruptcy Act." While Section 2075 does not expressly
mention appellate procedure, appeals in bankruptcy proceedings,
which are authorized not by the general law but by Section 24 of
the Bankruptcy Act, have always been regarded as an integral part
of the proceedings in Bankruptcy, and the legislative history of Section 2075 makes it clear that the authority that the statute grants
to the Supreme Court includes the power to make rules respecting
appeals. [footnotes omitted].
110. FED. R. APP. P. l(a), which reads:
Scope of rules. These rules govern procedure in appeals to
United States courts of appeals from the United States district courts
and the Tax Court of the United States; in proceedings in the courts
of appeals for review or enforcement of orders of administrative
agencies, boards, commissions and officers of the United States; and

in applications for writs or other relief which a court of appeals or
a judge thereof is competent to give.
111. 2A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 25 (14th ed. 1974) states:
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective July 1, 1968,
were prescribed pursuant to Sections 3771 and 3772 of Title 18,
United States Code, and Sections 2072 and 2075 of Title 28, United
States Code to govern the procedure in appeals to United States
courts of appeals from the United States district courts. As the
"courts of bankruptcy" referred to in § 24 of the Bankruptcy Act,
supra, include the United States district courts, these Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure apply to appeals under that section.
In Ward, The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 54 A.B.A.J. 661
(1968) it is said that the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure "regulate
practice and procedure in all proceedings that may be brought in a
United States court of appeals." (emphasis added). See also Henckenstein, Significant Changes in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
19 FED. INS. COUNSEL Q. 51. (Winter, 1968-1969). See also 11 U.S.C.S.
§ 47(b) which provides that Appellate jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings shall be "in the form and manner of an appeal."
112. FED. R. Civ. P. 73-6.
113. 115 F.2d 133, 134 (10th Cir. 1940).
114. 109 F.2d 774, 777 (10th Cir. 1940).
115. Supreme Court Order, December 4, 1967, 43 F.R.D. 61, 115-16. See
Ward, The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,28 FED. B.J. 100 (1968).
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of the abrogated rules we have the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
Even though they are based on rules which have been abrogated, the holdings of Scott 1 6 and Coursey' 17 are not totally
without use. Both may be presently interpreted as authority for
the proposition that the Federal Appellate Rules, the rules which
have replaced those upon which the cases were decided, apply
to bankruptcy proceedings.
CONCLUSION

We have seen that grave difficulties arise under the new
Bankruptcy Rules. Gaps remain wherein it is not clear which
mode of procedure, if any, governs a particular factual situation.
Inconsistent coverage exists in that the rules for one chapter
cover certain eventualities, but the rules for other chapters leave
the matter untouched. Worst of all, the implied repeal of inconsistent statutes causes gray areas to exist. The attorney cannot
predict in advance whether a particular statute has been repealed
by the rules or not. He must advise his client to take a position
in litigation and hope that the court will agree with his interpretation of the law.
This, of course, is not the end of the road. Good and dedicated men have spent long hours drafting the rules as they were
proposed. Now these rules are submitted to the practicing bar
to test them in the courtroom. After that experience is reported
and digested, necessary modifications can be made.
In any event, counsel is well advised to tread carefully in
this area of practice because danger lurks therein.

116. See note 17 supra.
117. See note 17 supra.

